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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Tapia-Lopez argued that the Idaho Supreme Court
denied him due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the
record on appeal with transcripts of the change of plea hearing, held on June 28, 2010,
the sentencing hearing, held on August 11, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on
January 10, 2011. Mr. Tapia-Lopez argues that the requested transcripts are necessary
for his appeal because the district court could utilize its own memory of the prior
proceedings when it executed a sentence after revocation of probation. In response,
the State argues that the only relevant transcript is the one from the final probation
disposition hearing.
This brief is necessary to address the State's assertion that the requested
transcripts are not relevant to the issues on appeal.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-10.)

Mr. Tapia-Lopez argues that the requested transcripts are relevant because a district
court can rely on its own memory of the prior proceedings when it decides to execute a
sentence upon revoking probation.

Since Idaho appellate courts conduct an

independent review of the entire record when determining whether a district court
abused its discretion in regard to a sentencing determination, what was specifically
presented to the district court at a probation violation disposition hearing does not define
the scope of review concerning the sentencing issue. The only questions are: whether
the information at issue was before the district court at any of the prior hearings, and
whether that information is relevant to the sentencing issues on appeal.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Tapia-Lopez's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief,
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Tapia-Lopez due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez's oral
Rule 35 motion requesting leniency?
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ARGUMENT
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary
Transcripts
A.

Introduction
In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making

sentencing decisions.

Due to this broad range of information considered, Idaho

appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants to provide an extensive
appellate record because they conduct an independent review of the entire record
before the district court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in
regard to a sentencing determination. In other words, the question on appeal generally
does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered.

Instead, the

central question is whether the record before the district court supports its sentencing
determination.
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information that was
before the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing
information supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of
the issue. In some instances, the Court of Appeals has refused to address the merits of
issues on appeal due to the appellants' failure to provide transcripts of hearings which
were never discussed by the district court and occurred years before the disposition of
the issue on appeal.
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B.

In The Event This Case Is Assigned To The Court Of Appeals, The Court Of
Appeals Has The Authority To Address The Issues Raised In The Appellant's
Brief

1.

The Idaho Rules Of Appellate Procedure Require The Idaho Court Of
Appeals To Address The Issues Raised In Mr. Tapia-Lopez's Appeal

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Tapia-Lopez argued that the denial of his request for
the transcripts violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protections
clauses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-18.) In response, the State argued, based on State v.
Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), that the Court of Appeals does not have the

authority to address Mr. Tapia-Lopez's due process argument because it is without
authority to review a decision made by the Idaho Supreme Court. (Respondent's Brief,
p.6 n3.) Contrary to the State's assertion, Idaho Appellate Rule 108 requires the Court
of Appeals to rule on the merits of all cases to which it is assigned by the Supreme
Court. 1 The relevant portions of I.AR. 108 state as follows:
Cases Reserved to Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals shall hear and
decide all cases assigned to it by the Supreme Court; provided that the
Supreme Court will not assign the following cases:
(1) Proceedings invoking the original jurisdiction of the Idaho
Supreme Court;
(2) Appeals from imposition of sentences of capital punishment in
criminal cases;
(3) Appeals from the Industrial Commission;
(4) Appeals from the Public Utilities Commission;
(5) Review of the recommendatory orders of the Board of
Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar;
1

In State v. Cornelison, 2013 Published Opinion 22 (Ct. App. April 11, 2013), the Court
of Appeals rejected a virtually identical argument. However, Cornelison is not yet final,
and Mr. Tapia-Lopez disagrees with the holding in that case.
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(6) Review of recommendatory orders of the Judicial Council.
(emphasis added). Since the issues raised in Mr. Tapia-Lopez's Appellant's Brief do not
fall into any of the foregoing categories, the Idaho Court of Appeals has the authority to
address the issues raised in his Appellant's Brief.
Further, an assignment of this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an
implicit grant of authority from the Idaho Supreme Court to review Mr. Tapia-Lopez's
claims about the constitutionality of the merits of its decision to deny his request for the
transcripts. The Supreme Court will be aware of Mr. Tapia-Lopez's due process and
equal protection issue when it makes it decision to either keep this appeal or assign it to
the Court of Appeals. This position is bolstered by the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court. Specifically, I.R.S.C. 21, which governs the assignment of cases. The language
of I.R.S.C. 21 follows:
Assignment of Cases. The chief justice (or designee) shall make the
tentative assignment of cases as between the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals. Copies of each assignment sheet shall be given to the
justices, affording each an opportunity to object and request the Court to
reconsider the assignment.

Any objection to the assignment shall be stated, with reasons, in writing
and circulated to all the justices.

At the request of any justice, the objection to the assignment shall be
taken up at conference.
The assignment of cases is not an arbitrary process; according to the Rule, it is a
deliberate process which affords all the justices the ability to object and provide input
into the decision to assign a case to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Supreme
Court will be aware of Mr. Tapia-Lopez's due process and equal protection arguments
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when it makes the decision to either keep this case or assign this case to the Court of
Appeals. In the event this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
will be implicitly granting the Court of Appeals authority to address the merits of
Mr. Tapia-Lopez's claims of error.
In sum, when the Idaho Supreme Court assigns an appeal to the Idaho Court of
Appeals, the Idaho Appellate Rules require the Court of Appeals to decide all issues
addressed

in that appeal.

Even though

Mr. Tapia-Lopez is challenging the

constitutionality of the Supreme Court's decision to deny his request for the transcripts,
an assignment of this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an implicit grant of
authority from the Idaho Supreme Court to review all issues raised in the Appellant's
Brief.
2.

An Assignment Of This Case to An Appellate Tribunal With No Authority To
Address Mr. Tapia-Lopez's Claims Of Error Will Violate His Right To
Procedural Due Process On Appeal

In the event the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this case to the Court of Appeals
and it determines that the Court of Appeals does not have the authority to address all of
the issues Mr. Tapia-Lopez's raised in his appellant's brief, he argues, in the alternative,
that such assignment will function as a separate denial of his federal due process rights,
which guarantee him a fair appeal. 2 The Constitutions of both United States and the
State of Idaho guarantee a criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const.
amend. XIV; ID Const. art. 1 § 13.

In Cornelison, supra, the Court of Appeals rejected a virtually identical argument.
However, Cornelison is not yet final, and Mr. Tapia-Lopez disagrees with the holding in
that case.
2
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It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132
Idaho 221,227 (1998).
While there is no federal guarantee to an appeal from criminal state court
proceedings, after a state decides to provide appellate review, the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable during the
entirety of the appellate proceedings.

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).

In

Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See I.C. § 19-2801.
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in Idaho
Appellate Rule 11.

An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment

affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an
appeal of right as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (c)(6).

See State v. Fuller, 104

Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (an order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under
Rule 35 is an appealable order pursuant to I.AR. 11 (c)(6)).
In this case, Mr. Tapia-Lopez argues that due process protections apply to every
stage of his appeal. Those protections apply to any appellate procedural decision made
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by the Idaho Supreme Court.

Even though Mr. Tapia-Lopez does not have an

independent right to appeal from the order denying his motion to augment, he can
challenge the constitutionality of the order because it is a procedural component of his
appeal and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause applies to all procedures
affecting his appeal. If the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this appeal to the Idaho Court
of Appeals, knowing that the Court of Appeals had no authority to reverse an order of
the Supreme Court, a unique and independent procedural due process violation will
occur because the Supreme Court will have precluded Mr. Tapia-Lopez from any state
procedure by which he could raise his federal constitutional claims challenging the
denial of his motion to augment.

C.

The Requested Transcripts Are Relevant Because Of The Applicable Standard of
Review And The Court Of Appeals' Presumption That The District Court Would
Utilize Its Own Memory Of The Prior Proceedings When It Denied Mr. TapiaLopez's Oral Rule 35 Motion
The State argues that the requested transcript is not relevant to the issue on

appeal.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-10.)

State

v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26 (Ct. App.

2009) made it clear what standard of review is applicable when the question on appeal
is what the appropriate sentence should be after probation is revoked. 3 In that case, the
Idaho Court of Appeals resolved an ongoing dispute about the proper standard of
review in probation revocation cases. Id. at 27. Relying on State

v. Chacon, 146 Idaho

Mr. Tapia-Lopez is appealing from the district court's order revoking probation, and
raising on appeal the district court's decision to deny his oral Rule 35 motion. When the
district court denied that motion it was determining the appropriate sentence to execute
after revoking probation. As such, the standard of review articulated in Hanington is
applicable to the question of whether the district court abused its discretion when it
denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez's oral Rule 35 motion.
3
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520, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2008), and State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392 (Ct. App. 1992), the
State sought to limit review to only facts that had arisen between the original
pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation proceedings. Hanington, 148 Idaho
at 28. Essentially, the State's position would have eliminated any need for appellate
courts to review the change of plea hearing transcript, the sentencing transcript, and the
presentence report, because all of that information would have been available to the
district court prior to the original sentencing hearing. See id. Hanington argued that the
proper standard of review should include a review of "all facts existing both at the time
of the original sentence and at the time the sentence is ordered into execution," relying
on the standard established in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-1056 (Ct. App.
1989). Id. at 27. The Court of Appeals agreed with Hanington and held:
The State has read our somewhat differing versions of the scope of review
too restrictively. We have not intended to suggest that our review is limited
solely to events occurring between the original imposition of sentence and
the decision to order the sentence into execution. When we review a
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we
will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation.
Id.

The Hanington Court made it clear that when determining what sentence to
execute, the appellate court would review the entire record, including the factors at the
original sentencing hearing through the probation revocation before the court on appeal.
The rationale behind this clarification makes perfect sense when looking to State v.
Adams, the decision that explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire

record when reviewing the executed sentence:
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[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked,
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. As such, when an appellant files an appeal from an

order revoking probation and challenges the length of his/her sentence, the applicable
standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry to the events
which occurred prior to as well as the events which occurred during the probation
revocation proceedings. The basis for this standard of review is that the judge "naturally
and quite properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant
facts in reaching a decision." Id. Based on that presumption, the Court of Appeals held
that, "When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same facts." Id. The Court
of Appeals did not hold that the district court must expressly reference the prejudgment
events at the probation disposition hearing in order for this standard of review to
become applicable.

To the contrary, the Court of Appeals presumed the judge will

automatically consider the prejudgment events when determining whether to execute or
reduce a sentence after revoking probation.
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The State also argues that the requested transcript was never presented to the
district court and, therefore, was never part of the record before the district court and
cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.)
Contrary to the State's position, the question of whether the transcripts of the requested
proceedings were before the district court at the time of the hearing from which
Mr. Tapia-Lopez is appealing is not relevant in deciding whether the transcripts are
relevant to the issues on appeal. That is because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a
district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the proceeding
from which the appeal is filed.

Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained

from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74
(Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the
findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard
during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could
rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has
observed in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein
involved");

State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing

court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously
dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he
already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearing was
transcribed is irrelevant, because the district court could rely upon the information it
already knew from presiding over the hearings at issue. Moreover, in Adams, supra, the
Court of Appeals presumed that the district court would rely upon such information and,
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therefore, it needed transcripts of the prior proceedings to consider the same facts
presumptively utilized by the district court.
Additionally, the State's position is unworkable because all transcripts, except a
transcript of the hearing from which an appeal is taken, would be deemed new
information. This is inconsistent with the holding from State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271,
276 (Ct. App. 2000), where the district court examined the defendant about his guilty
plea during the change of plea hearing. Since the defendant in Burdett failed to provide
a transcript of that hearing on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed that something
occurred in that hearing which supported the district court's sentencing decision. Id.
If the State's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, a transcript of a
defendant's original sentencing hearing would be new information in instances where an
appeal is filed from a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency.

Further, if that is new

information, a district court should not, absent a transcript, consider what happened at
sentencing when evaluating a Rule 35 motion. However, in State v. Wright, 114 Idaho
451, 452-453 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address the merits
of an appeal from the denial of an Rule 35 motion because the appellant failed to
provide the PSI and a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the appellate record. See
also State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984).

In sum, the Hanington Opinion controls the applicable standard of review when a
sentence is challenged after a period of probation. As such, the requested transcripts
are relevant to the sentencing issue raised on appeal, and lack of access to those
transcripts will preclude a merits based review of his sentencing issue.
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11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez's Oral Rule 35
Motion Requesting Leniency
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues, based on State v. Huffman, 144
Idaho 201 (2007), that this Court has no ability to review Mr. Tapia-Lopez's claim that
the district court abused its discretion when it denied his oral Rule 35 motion because
Mr. Tapia-Lopez did not provide any new information which was not before the district
court at sentencing. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-14.) Contrary to the State's position,
the holding in Huffman is not applicable in this matter due to the differing procedural
postures of this matter and Huffman.
In Huffman, the defendant was appealing from a Rule 35 motion requesting
leniency, which was filed after the original judgment of conviction. Id. at 202. Based on
that specific procedural posture, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Rule 35 motions
must be supported by new or additional information to prevent Rule 35 motions from
functioning as an appeal from a sentence and, thus, circumventing I.AR. 14(a)'s
requirement that an appeal be filed within forty days from a final judgment. Id. That
concern is not applicable when a defendant requests a sentence reduction at a
probation disposition hearing because the defendant must file an appeal from the denial
of an oral Rule 35 motion within forty two days from the order revoking probation. I.AR.
14(a). Moreover, there will always be new information when an oral Rule 35 motion is
made at a probation violation disposition hearing because all of the events which
occurred during the most recent period of probation constitutes new information. It can
also be argued that Mr. Tapia-Lopez's request for a sentence reduction is, in substance,
not an oral Rule 35 motion, but rather a request that the district court exercise its
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inherent Rule 35 power to reduce a sentence after revoking probation. See State v.
Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003).

In sum, the Huffman new information requirement is not applicable when an oral
Rule 35 motion is made at probation violation disposition hearing, because an appeal
from the denial of such a motion must be made within forty two days from the order
revoking probation as per I.A.R. 14(a). As such, the Huffman Court's concern that Rule
35 motion will be used to circumvent I.AR. 14(a) is not applicable when oral Rule 35
motions are made at probation violation disposition hearings.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Tapia-Lopez respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Tapia Lopez
respectfully requests that this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence.
Alternatively, Mr. Tapia Lopez requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate.
DATED this 3rd day of June, 2013 .

.~

·

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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